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DEREGULATION AND THE TROGLODYTES -
HOW THE AIRLINES MET ADAM SMITH
By HERBERT D. KELLEHER*
A LMOST 200 YEARS after his death, Adam Smith's
ethereal invisible hand swept across the American air-
line industry, brushing aside in its wake a regulatory struc-
ture which for forty years had bred the arrogance, slothful
inefficiency and unresponsiveness inherent in an industry
which has substituted paternal "regulation" by a suppos-
edly omniscient regent for the competitive impetus of a
free marketplace. Through a single broad stroke, enacted
with the support of a newly-enlightened regulatory
agency under the leadership of Chairman Alfred Kahn,
Congress set the airlines free of the regulatory strictures
which had constrained the innovation of service alterna-
tives, restricted market entry and discouraged price com-
petition. As might be expected of a troupe of competitive
troglodytes emerging from the protective cocoon of a reg-
ulated existence, some members of the newly liberated
sect suffered, and some prospered, while some fell into a
boiling caldron.'
Because deregulation of the airline industry provided
much of the stimulus for a general reevaluation of the be-
neficence of economic regulation of other potentially
competitive industries (such as communications, 2 truck-
*President and Chief Executive Officer, Southwest Airlines Co.
, Cf The Three Little Pigs (in which the boiling caldron was reserved for one who
tried to eat too many little pigs in one day).
2 See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 1240 (1983); Repeal of
the 'Regional Concentration of Control' Provisions of the Commission's Multiple
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ing,3 and financial services 4), it may be of some moment,
although perhaps somewhat premature, to evaluate the
impact of airline deregulation upon the industry, the com-
munities it serves and, most importantly, upon the con-
sumers the industry exists to serve. Although the view is
far from unanimous, 5 the weight of evidence and experi-
ence strongly suggests that despite tremendous unfore-
seen obstacles arising from the unprecedented escalation
of fuel costs, a severe economic "recession" which might
be more aptly described as a "depression" in the airline
industry, unprecedented high interest rates and the dis-
jointing of our national air transportation system caused
by the PATCO strike, deregulation has served our nation
well. Indeed, a strong case can be made that it was only
the flexibility and creativity made possible by deregula-
tion that saved the airline industry from unmitigated dis-
aster during the period from 1978 to 1983.
In reality, the Airline Deregulation Act of 19786 did not
instantaneously deregulate the airline industry, but insti-
tuted a gradual process of regulatory change, culminating
in the abolition of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in
1985. 7 Perceptive economists had for some time recog-
Ownership Rules, 49 Fed. Reg. 2,478 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73)
(proposed Jan. 20, 1984); Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Televison Broad-
cast Stations, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,438 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (pro-
posed Oct. 24, 1983), corrected, 48 Fed. Reg. 50,907 (Nov. 4, 1983).
See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at 49
U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1982)).
See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); see also Gorinson, Depository Institution Regulatory Reform in the 1980s: The
Issue of Geographic Restrictions, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 227 (1983).
5 See Kay, All Flights Cancelled, TEXAS BUSINESS, May 1984, at 36; Deregulation Foes
in Counterattack, Los Angeles Times, July 3, 1983, pt. VI at 8, col. 1.
6 Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 - 1552 (1982)).
7 An entertaining commentary on the "causes" of the airline Deregulation
movement can be found in Callison, Airline Deregulation-Only Partially A Hoax The
Current Status of the Airline Deregulation Movement, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 961, 962-64
n.4, 965 (1980). Mr. Callison, the Senior Vice President-General Counsel for
Delta Air Lines, concludes that:
Viewed by hindsight, the leaders of the airline deregulation move-
ment were Senators Cannon and Kennedy, Congressman Elliot
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nized that CAB regulation resulted in greater inefficiency
and higher fares than would otherwise have existed.8
These views gained support from the successful introduc-
tion of efficient low-fare air service in the intrastate mar-
kets of California by PSA and Air California, and Texas by
Southwest Airlines, where state regulatory agencies
adopted liberal entry and pricing policies approximating
economic "deregulation." 9 In 1975, the CAB appointed a
special staff to study proposals for regulatory reform, re-
sulting in a staff recommendation that public utility-type
controls be eliminated within three to five years.10 The
report concluded that the airline industry "is naturally
competitive, not monopolistic," and that regulation
caused higher-than-necessary costs and prices, weakened
the ability of carriers to respond to market demands and
narrowed the range of price/quality choices available to
the consumer." Thus, the industry was hardly shocked
when Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure recommended that the focus
of the nation's aviation policy should shift from promot-
ing the well-being of the aviation industry to making its
service economically available to more of the American
public.12 Nor was the industry surprised when President
Levitas, Dr. Alfred Kahn, and the Ford Administration, spurred on,
of course, by the various academic economists who pushed the the-
ory in the beginning and throughout. The Carter Administration
also played a role, but its major contribution was appointing Alfred
Kahn to the CAB.
Id. at 964 n.4.
8 G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANS-
PORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974); Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance,
3 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. ScI. 399 (1972); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN
AMERICA (1970); R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY
STUDY (1962).
o See SIMAT, HELLIESON & EICHER INC., AN ANALYSIS FOR THE INTRASTATE AIR
CARRIER REGULATORY FORUM, VOLUME I SUMMARY REPORT (1976); Note, Is Regula-
tion Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatoy Policy, 74 YALE LJ.
1416 (1965).
10 Report of the CAB Special Staff on Regulatory Reform (1975).
11 Executive Summary of Report of the CAB Special Staff on Regulatory Re-
form at 1 (1975).
12 SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 94TH
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Ford sent to Congress a comprehensive program of re-
form entitled the Aviation Act of 1975, which was
designed to allow greater pricing flexibility and freedom
of entry. ' 3
The transition to deregulation began in 1977 with the
appointment of Dr. Alfred Kahn as Chairman of the CAB.
Under the leadership of Dr. Kahn, the CAB commenced
its first major low-fare route case, in which it expressly re-
quested parties to explore whether the authority to enter
a market should be permissive and whether more than
one applicant should be granted authority in each city-
pair market. 14 A year later, the CAB went further and
proposed to award multiple authority to all qualified ap-
plicants by nonhearing show cause proceedings, eliminat-
ing the lengthy hearings of the comparative selection
process and the restriction of entry to a single carrier.' 5
About the same time, the CAB also began approving indi-
vidual carriers' proposals for discount and promotional
fares, such as Texas International's "Peanuts" fare,16 and
American's "Supersaver" fare from New York to the
West Coast.' 7 By the late fall of 1977, the CAB had de-
cided not to intervene through promulgation of discount
fare policies and had adopted the view that allowing air-
lines to implement their own pricing strategies could sig-
nificantly improve the economic performance of the
industry."'
The CAB's decision to reduce price restrictions coin-
cided with the most favorable part of the business cycle
CONG., IST SESS., AIRLINE REGULATION OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (Comm.
Print 1975).
,, S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 33,505-509 (1975).
14 Chicago-Midway Low-Fare Route Proceeding, 78 C.A.B. 454 (1978).
15 Oakland Service Case, 78 C.A.B. 593 (1978).
1, Texas International Airlines "Peanuts" Fares Proceeding, 72 C.A.B. 868
(1977).
,7 American Airlines "Supersaver" Fares Proceeding, 73 C.A.B. 1066 (1977).
The "Peanuts" fare and "Supersaver" fare decisions were made under Chairman
John Robson, who preceded Alfred Kahn as CAB Chairman.
18 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES - AN Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 121 (1983).
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for the industry, so that substantial fare reductions tapped
price-sensitive segments of the public and resulted in a
substantial increase in demand for air service. In 1978,
traffic grew markedly in response to the wide availability
of deep discount fares. Average fares (adjusted for infla-
tion) fell almost nine percent. Load factors increased
more than five points, and carrier profits increased
markedly. la
Thus, by the time President Carter signed the Airline
Deregulation Act on October 18, 1978, the theories of the
deregulation economists and the experiences of intra-
state carriers in Texas and California seemed confirmed
by the real-life experiment of limited deregulation of the
CAB-regulated carriers. The trunk carriers were exper-
iencing substantial increases in loads, enjoying healthy
profits, and aggressively plotting their own post-deregula-
tion courses. Aircraft manufacturers were enjoying boun-
tiful orders for new aircraft. Deregulation appeared to be
a panacea to everyone associated with the industry.
In 1979, however, things began to turn sour for much
of the industry. Events in the Middle East precipitated a
sudden rise in fuel prices. Between the first quarters of
1979 and 1980, the CAB permitted average fares to in-
crease by thirty-one percent, but even this could not keep
pace with the rapid increase in costs occasioned largely by
the more than doubling of the price of fuel.20 The econ-
omy then began a prolonged recession. Interest rates
skyrocketed, wreaking havoc on the balance sheets of
highly leveraged carriers who had the misfortune to have
recently-acquired or floating-rate debt. Carriers such as
Braniff, which had aggressively acquired new aircraft and
entered new markets in the anticipation of reaping a de-
regulation bonanza, and Republic, which borrowed heav-
ily to acquire Hughes Airwest, were among the hardest
hit.
In 1981, which was marked by the disruption following
19 Id. at 39-40.
20 Id. at 42.
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the PATCO strike, the former trunk airlines, 21 in the ag-
gregate, had an operating losses of approximately $480
million. For 1982, the operating losses widened to ap-
proximately $650 million, not including losses suffered by
Braniff or Texas Air, the holding company parent of Con-
tinental.22 Adding Braniff and Continental increased the
1982 operating losses by over $67 million.23
Does this dismal aggregate performance by the largest,
and formerly most regulated, members of the airline in-
dustry render deregulation a failure? Even assuming all
the airlines' woes were attributable to deregulation, which
they clearly are not, the answer would still be "no." De-
regulation has produced substantial societal benefits in
the form of lower fares, increased service, diversity of ser-
vice and price alternatives, reduced industry concentra-
tion, more efficient allocation of resources and, in the
long run, a more healthy, efficient and innovative airline
industry.
Analysis of the effect of deregulation on airlines fares
must begin with a recognition of the fact that between
1976, the last year before relaxation of regulation began,
and 1983, the year after the CAB's route, rate and tariff
authority ended,24 airline costs increased by seventy-one
percent, yet fares increased by only forty-five percent. Be-
tween the year ending September 1978, just before the
Deregulation Act was passed, and June 1983, costs in-
creased by fifty-four percent while fares increased thirty-
nine percent. 25 Thus, it appears that the cost-plus
method of pricing, which existed under CAB regulation,
has been destroyed and that, in the aggregate, consumers
are enjoying the benefits of substantially lower fares than
21 American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, Pan American,
TWA, United and Western. Republic and U.S. Air have, since deregulation, been
added to the list of "trunks."
22 Derchin & Tortor, First Boston Research Aviation Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1983.
23 Civil Aeronautics Board Report to Congress, Implementation of the Provi-
sions of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Appendix D (1984).
24 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a) (1984).
25 Civil Aeronautics Board Report to Congress, supra note 23, at 20.
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would otherwise exist. Under regulation, the CAB ad-
justed fares with a focus on industry profitability. From
1960 to 1974, the Board set fares to achieve an average
10.5 percent rate of return for the industry based on ac-
tual industry operating costs. Beginning in 1974, the
Board set fares to yield a twelve percent return based on
"optimal" industry load factors and seating density.26
The benefit of the substantial aggregate savings result-
ing from deregulation has not, of course, been spread
evenly. The CAB adjustment of fares operated uniformily
for all markets, without regard to market density or level
of competition. Fare levels were generally related to dis-
tance, with long-haul fares set substantially above cost
and short-haul fares deliberately set below cost.2 7 Conse-
quently, the CAB-regulated carriers frequently allowed
their quality of service on the unprofitable short-haul
routes to reflect their disdain for these markets.28
With carriers now free to set their own pricing policies,
prices tend to reflect market forces as well as cost.
Although subject to temporary distortions, fares are gen-
erally tending to find their natural level, reflecting the
price at which service can economically be provided on a
market-by-market basis. The competitive market forces
now shaping the airlines' fare structures reflect, in a way
government regulators never could, the actual: cost of
providing the most efficient service to a specific market.
The presence of actual and potential competition in every
market provides strong discipline against pricing practices
which would produce super-normal profits.
The impact of actual competition on fares has been dra-
matic in many markets. For example, when Southwest
opened its first interstate route from Houston to New Or-
leans in early 1979, the one-way standard coach fares in
26 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 103.
27 Id. at 102-44.
28 See Texas Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, 454 S.W.2d 199, 202-03
(Tex. 1970) (record of cancelled flights and late flights on routes served by CAB
certificated carriers in the Dallas, Houston and San Antonio markets).
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the market were $50 to $52. Southwest entered the mar-
ket offering unrestricted fares of $30 for every seat on
every flight before 7:00 p.m. on weekdays, and $20 on
weekends and weekday evenings. 29 Six years later, de-
spite precipitous increases in fuel costs and six years of
inflation, Southwest serves that market with hourly flights
and unrestricted fares of $55 and $40. Today Southwest
offers unrestricted weekend and evening fares for every
seat substantially below the prevailing standard coach
fares offered by the old CAB-regulated carriers in 1979.
And several competitors match Southwest's fares,
although most do so on a "restricted" basis.3 0
The benefits of actual competition have, to be sure,
taken longer to reach some markets than others. For ex-
ample, in March 1984, when Southwest commenced ser-
vice between Dallas and Little Rock, the standard coach
fare offered by incumbent carriers was $139 and $149,
and the lowest restricted fare was $89. 3 1 Southwest en-
tered the market offering unrestricted coach fares of $47
for every seat on weekdays before 7:00 p.m., and $32 for
every seat on weekends and weekday evenings. The in-
cumbent carriers suddenly discovered that they, too,
could economically provide service at those fares, albeit
on a restricted basis. 32 Other low-fare carriers, such as
People Express and Northeastern, have brought about
similar dramatic fare reductions upon entering new
markets.
Although fares are markedly higher in markets not
served by new, low-fare entrants, even in these markets
the threat of competition from potential new-market en-
trants serves to discipline pricing practices. The freedom
of airlines to enter markets at will has caused most airline
city-pair markets to become readily contestable. The ma-
29 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE NORTH AMERICAN EDITION (February 1, 1979) [here-
inafter cited as OAG].
so OAG FARE ISSUE, supra note 29 (March 1, 1984).
31 OAG, supra note 29 (Mar. 1, 1984).
32 OAG, supra note 29 (Apr. 15, 1984).
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jor economic barrier to entry into specific markets is the
acquisition and location of aircraft. Aircraft, however, are
readily movable from one market to another, and do not
represent the type of "sunk costs" which, once sunk, be-
come a true barrier to entry. 33
The principle of market contestability means that a car-
rier which overprices its product risks market entry by a
lower-priced competitor. In the three years from 1978 to
1981, 122 of the 200 most heavily traveled markets exper-
ienced entry by at least one new carrier.3 4 A prudent
competitor will seek out markets that are underserved or
overpriced, for these markets present the greatest poten-
tial for profit. Moreover, experience demonstrates that
lower fares and increased competition serve to increase
traffic, making underserved and overpriced markets par-
ticularly attractive. For example, with the entry of South-
west Airlines' low fares and frequent service in 1971, air
traffic between Dallas and Houston increased 127.5%
from 1970 to 1974, while ten similar high-density CAB-
regulated markets grew an average of only 9.8 percent
during the same period." Similar experiences have been
encountered repeatedly as Southwest has entered new
markets with its low fares and frequent flights. This in-
crease in total traffic, generally resulting in high load fac-
tors for Southwest, is frequently accomplished without a
significant impact upon the incumbent carriers' traffic in
the market. In part, this is attributable to the incumbents'
own reduction in fares and is, in part, the result of traffic
which is newly generated or attracted from surface trans-
portation in short-haul markets.
The impact of fares upon traffic is demonstrated on a
more global scale by the experience of carriers as a whole
under deregulation. In 1978, fare rates per revenue pas-
senger mile (RPM) fell by 8.5% while traffic grew by
33 Bailey & Panzar, The Constestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to De-
regulation, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 125, 128-29 (1981).
E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM, & D. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 90.
s5 Id. at 22.
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16.7% The next year fares again fell, this time by only
5.3% while traffic again grew, by a more modest 11.1%.
In 1980, however, impelled by higher fuel costs, fares
rose by 13.5%. Traffic, consequently, fell by 5.4%. In
1981, fares rose by 2.5% and traffic dropped by 3.7%.6
In 1982, the carriers' fares fell 3.76%; traffic rose 6.2% 7
In 1983, fares fell by 0.5%, and traffic climbed by a strong
11.2%.38 The pattern is unmistakable.
The impact of potential competition on fares is demon-
strated by the fact that ticket prices at slot-constrained air-
ports tend to be higher than those at airports that are not
slot-constrained.3 9 Similarly, markets with only one CAB-
certificated carrier in 1979, when market entry still gener-
ally entailed cumbersome CAB proceedings, had statisti-
cally higher fares than those with multiple authorized
carriers. Markets with only one authorized carrier aver-
aged fares at ninety-seven percent of the standard indus-
try fare level (SIFL), while those markets with more than
one authorized carrier, where actual or potential entry
was readily possible, averaged ninety percent of the
SIFL.40
Experience with fare deregulation suggests that mar-
kets which continue to endure noncompetitive fares either
cannot economically support service at lower fares, or
have simply not yet been "found" by an aggressive com-
petitor ready to cut fares to gain market share. If the for-
mer is the case, then there should be little room for
complaint, since the market is receiving exactly the level
of service it is capable of supporting. If the latter is the
case, time and natural market forces will resolve the situa-
.' Id. at 40. These fare figures are adjusted for inflation.
37 M. Derchin & R. Tortora, supra note 22.
- M. DERCHIN & R. TORTORA, AIRLINE INDUSTRY: FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL
YEAR 1983 RETROSPECTIVE (Mar. 7, 1984). Derchin and Tortora's fare figures are
not adjusted for inflation. The magnitude of the 1983 and 1984 fare decreases is
therefore understated.
9 Graham, Kaplan & Sibley, Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry, 14
BELLJ. ECON. 118, 124 (1983); Note, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93
YALE L.J. 319, 328 (1983).
40 Bailey & Panzar, supra note 33, at 137-38.
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tion in due course. Perceptive airline route managers reg-
ularly scan maps, airline boarding figures, and prevailing
fare levels in search of market openings. In any event, it is
clear that the free market can better tell airlines where to
cut fares than the government can (which it seldom did).
Discussion of air service to small communities since de-
regulation has frequently centered upon two misconcep-
tions: (1) that the rate of loss of air service to small
communities has increased with deregulation; and (2) that
the loss of service that has occurred is attributable to de-
regulation. Each of these assumptions is incorrect.
During the ten years from 1968 to 1978, the CAB de-
leted 127 points from carrier certificates, often conclud-
ing that the subsidy cost did not justify continued service.
Suspension of service without replacement was permitted
at another 64 points. 4' Thus, the Board was deleting
points at a rate of over one per month prior to deregula-
tion, and even the points receiving service frequently re-
ceived inadequate or unsatisfactory service (with flights at
inconvenient times to remote locations). The Deregula-
tion Act sought to halt this trend with the establishment
of the Essential Air Service (EAS) Program. Under this
program, the CAB was charged with assuring through
subsidies or carrier "lock-in" procedures that "essential
air service" is provided to any community receiving ser-
vice from only one certificated carrier on October 24,
1978, to any community whose service was thereafter re-
duced to only one carrier, and to any community whose
service was authorized, but had been suspended, on Octo-
ber 28, 1978.42 The CAB was also responsible for resusci-
tating service to communities whose service had been
deleted from carrier certificates before deregulation. 3
Between 1978 and 1983, the number of departures at
4 Civil Aeronautics Board Report to Congress, supra note 23, at 47-49.
42 49 U.S.C. § 1389(2) (1982). Authority over the EAS became housed in the
Department of Transportation when the CAB was dismantled on December 31,
1984. 49 U.S.C.A. §1551(b)(1)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
4s 49 U.S.C. § 1389(b) (1982). The Department of Transportaion now exer-
cises this authority. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1551(b)(l)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
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EAS points actually increased by 5.2%, although the
number of seats in these markets decreased by 13.7%. 44
This increase in departures and decrease in seats is largely
attributable to the improved suitability of aircraft size to
markets.
Convenient air service, especially in thinly traveled mar-
kets, is far more related to frequency of service than to the
number of available seats. If the frequency is available,
the market will have an opportunity to demand for itself
the number of seats necessary to serve the market.
Although the size of aircraft serving small communities
has generally decreased, the quality of service has proba-
bly improved overall. Small communities now receive
more flights and greater service to small hubs than before,
giving them better access to major commercial centers
and connecting flights, rather than the "milk runs" they
historically had received.45
While the facts suggest that small communities have
benefitted from the passage of the Deregulation Act, the
continued comparatively high level of government regula-
tion of small-to-medium markets may actually be injuring
efforts of those communties to attract air service by larger
carriers. Unlike other unregulated markets, EAS points
may not be freely exited by the "last" carrier providing
service. A certificated carrier must give the CAB ninety
days notice before exiting the market. Even after the
ninety-day waiting period expires, the carrier is subject to
being "locked-in" and prevented from leaving the market
until a replacement carrier is found.46 This well-meaning
attempt to protect communities from the total loss of air
service represents a formidable obstacle to a carrier seek-
ing the most efficient allocation of its resources.
Although the carrier is entitled ultimately to be reim-
bursed for any "losses" incurred after the ninety-day no-
44 Civil Aeronautics Board Report to Congress, supra note 23, at 49.
45 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM, & D. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 94-96.
46 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6).
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tice period,4 7 trunk and major regional airlines are not
likely to be attracted by the prospect of a government sub-
sidy to cover "losses" whose calculation may be subject
to lengthy and contested proceedings. Airlines looking at
the commitment of an aircraft costing at least $15 million
are more likely to be deterred by the knowledge that they
cannot easily remove the aircraft to a market where it can
make a profit. Thus, the spirit of entrepreneurial experi-
mentation which might lead prudent businesspersons in a
free market to "take a chance" on many smaller communi-
ties may well be dampened. The obligation of the "last
carrier" to continue service indefinitely has, moreover,
undoubtedly hastened the departures of numerous "next
to last" carriers seeking to "bail out" before being sad-
dled with an essential service obligation. To the extent
that small communities can complain of their inability to
attract "major" carriers since deregulation, their frustra-
tions might, in some cases at least, be more appropriately
directed at the remnants of regulation rather than
deregulation.
Airline routes and service patterns have undergone
substantial change since market entry was made discre-
tionary and the rules for market exit were greatly liberal-
ized. On the average, a carrier served about the same
number of nonstop routes in 1983 as in 1978, but only
about forty percent of its nonstop routes were between
the same points.48 The origins of the regulated domestic
route structure can be traced back to the Hoover Admin-
istration, which granted transcontinental mail route au-
thority to the predecessors of American, TWA, and
United, and established Eastern as the north-south carrier
on the East Coast.49 Piecemeal route awards by the CAB
for the new single-plane or nonstop service hardly con-
tributed to the creation of rational or economic route
structures for the regulated carriers. Route applications
47 id. § 1389(a)(7)(B).
48 Civil Aeronautics Board Report to Congress, supra note 23, at 28-29.
49 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 55.
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sometimes took years for decision. In addition, the choice
between competing applicants was frequently influenced
by a carrier's economic need. 50
Quite predictably, the carriers, once given the opportu-
nity, set about reorganizing their route structures. The
trunk airlines have generally sought to convert to "hub-
and-spoke" networks centered at major airports where
they can gather and sort passengers. Through the use of
hubs,5 ' carriers hope to dominate traffic in their respec-
tive geographic regions. Such a system has strong eco-
nomic justification, allocating resources quite efficiently.
For example, a connecting complex serving 20 points ac-
tually services 400 potential city-pairs with every complete
"turn." Many markets, including small and mid-size mar-
kets, which could not otherwise support the level of ser-
vice they receive, are thereby afforded efficient single-
carrier through and connecting service to much of the
country. Through its connecting complex at the Dallas-
Fort Worth International Airport, for example, American
provides passengers from Lubbock, Amarillo, Midland-
Odessa and virtually every other sizable city in the South-
west efficient single-carrier connecting service to New
York, Boston, Detroit and even London - service of a
quality that those and comparable cities would likely lack
in the absence of a "hub-and spoke" system.
Deregulation has certainly resulted in the loss of non-
stop and single-plane service in some markets, but such
service has also been added to others. The proportion of
passengers receiving single-plane service has actually in-
creased from 73% in 1978 to 74.7% in 1983. The per-
centage of passengers able to complete their journey on a
single carrier has also increased, from 89.1% in 1978 to
-o Id. at 59-61.
51 Among the trunk carriers, American has established an outstanding hub at
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport; Delta and Eastern, at Atlanta; United at
Chicago, Denver and San Francisco; and US Air, at Pittsburgh. Other major hubs
include Continental at Houston Intercontinental and Denver, TWA at St. Louis,
Frontier at Denver, Northwest at Minneapolis-St. Paul, Ozark at St. Louis, West-
ern at Salt Lake City, and People Express at Newark.
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96.7% in 1982.52 Although isolated examples of loss of
nonstop and single-plane service can undoubtedly be
cited, the statistics suggest that the airlines' reorganiza-
tion of their route systems has improved rather than di-
minished the quality of service. While Nashville, for
example, may have lost its American nonstop flights to
Los Angeles, it gained the benefit of American's efficient
connecting complex at DFW, giving it single-carrier ser-
vice throughout much of the Southwest and West. Fur-
thermore, if the service that was lost were in sufficient
demand, another carrier would likely fill the void in due
course. Airlines, like nature, abhor a vacuum.
Moreover, the movement to "hub-and-spoke" systems
has created the opportunity for new market initiatives by
aggressive competitors. Piedmont, for example, has de-
veloped "hubs" at such relatively less congested points as
Charlotte, Dayton and Baltimore and has actively pro-
moted its "bypass" strategy of allowing passengers to
avoid congested major hubs. Southwest, of course, has
significant hubs at Dallas Love Field and Houston Hobby
Airport, both previously abandoned by the trunk carri-
ers. 5 3 Southwest has also successfully introduced point-
to-point nonstop service in numerous markets, bypassing
its hubs in order, for example, to fly San Antonio passen-
gers nonstop to El Paso, Phoenix, Los Angeles and the
Rio Grande Valley. Austin passengers likewise have non-
stop service to Midland-Odessa, Lubbock, El Paso, the
Rio Grande Valley and Phoenix. Other airlines evaluating
opportunities for their own markets will undoubtedly take
notice of these successful route systems bypassing major
hubs. In 1985, however, unlike 1975, public demand for
the service, rather than governmental decisions or mere
52 Civil Aeronautics Board Report to Congress, supra note 23, at 35.
53 Since it was reopened to commercial service by Southwest in 1972, Hobby
Airport has undergone a complete revitalization and is presently served by Ameri-
can, Delta, Republic, Ozark, Muse, and Southwest, as well as several commuter
carriers.
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happenstance, will dictate the airlines' decisions to enter
new markets.
The product of free price competition and market entry
has been an unprecedented array of service alternatives
for the consumer. The rigidity of the regulatory structure
allowed passengers few choices of fares or of levels of ser-
vice. Rivalry among carriers tended to be in the form of
nonprice competition - flight frequency, food and bever-
age services, flight equipment and advertsing. The for-
mer regulatory scheme encouraged this cost-increasing
nonprice competition and necessitated fare increases jus-
tified only by the rising costs for which it was
responsible.54
With the advent of deregulation, the market has exper-
ienced new levels of service and fare competition. Newly
certificated carriers have adopted widely varying business
strategies. The success of People Express has proven that
a substantial percentage of airline passengers are not will-
ing, given the choice, to pay for such amenities as meals
or baggage checking. People Express charges extra even
for such amenities as soft drinks and sells tickets on the
airplane while the passengers are in the air. But it offers
the lowest fares in the industry, has extremely high load
factors, and generally makes money. At the other end 'of
the "new entrant" spectrum, Air One offered nothing but
first class service, flew 727 aircraft equipped exclusively
with first class seats four abreast, and served complimen-
tary meals on china while charging standard coach and
discount fares and went bankrupt. New York Air started
as a low-fare carrier, but has successfully converted to a
more business-oriented service, charging comparatively
higher fares and offering what is perceived as a higher
quality of service. Midway has similarly shifted corporate
strategy from its initial low-fare concept to its upscale
business-class "Metrolink" service, offered at standard
coach fares. Muse Air introduced its service as the non-
54 Phillips, Airline Mergers in the New Regulatory Environment, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
856, 856 (1981).
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smoking airline by banning smoking on all fights. Jet
America has found its market niche by providing standard
services between Southern, though the satellite Long
Beach Airport, California and major cities such as Chi-
cago and Dallas-Fort Worth. Southwest has maintained
its strategy of offering unrestricted low fares, high fre-
quency and single-class service while expanding its service
from Texas to ten additional states since deregulation.
These newly certificated carriers, and others like them,
have brought something unique to the markets they serve.
The widespread impact and acceptance of these new serv-
ices is evidenced by the decline in the proportion of pas-
sengers traveling on standard "Y" coach fares from sixty
percent in 1977 to twenty-five percent in 1982. 55 Such in-
novation and variety would have been unlikely under a
regulatory scheme which in forty years had never awarded
a single major route to a new entrant.56
The ability of new carriers to start service and the op-
portunity for expansion by existing carriers have, contrary
to some predictions, reduced the level of concentration in
the airline industry. New entrants represent the fastest
growing segment of the industry. Between 1976 and
1982, the trunk carriers' share of domestic traffic dropped
from eighty-eight percent to seventy-nine percent. This
limited deconcentration of the industry has coincided with
widespread public acceptance of the fare and service alter-
natives offered by the new entrants.
The ultimate standard by which deregulation is mea-
sured, however, often is the effect of deregulation on the
economic health of the airline industry itself. As sug-
gested earlier, it is at least arguable that deregulation
came along just in time to save the airline industry, and
the nation itself, from a major debacle. Given the inverse
relationship between fares and passenger boardings, what
would have happened to passenger traffic if fare levels
55 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 130.
56 Civil Aeronautics BoardReport to Congress, supra note 23, at 7.
57 E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 44.
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had followed the historical cost-plus approach of regula-
tion and actually exceeded, rather than falling 15 points
short of, the fifty-four percent increase in costs between
1978 and 1983? It is not difficult to imagine the incanta-
tion of the regulated carriers: "We need even higher
fares because of the lower loads caused by our high
fares." In the airline industry, the cost of a flight is af-
fected relatively little by the number of passengers. The
incremental cost of carrying one additional passenger is
slight while the loss of that passenger represents a dispro-
portinate loss of revenue. Put another way, a decrease in
the number of passengers results in an increase in the av-
erage cost per passenger because total costs are relatively
constant regardless of the number of passengers. The ris-
ing fare/declining load cycle may feed on itself, poten-
tially sending airlines balance sheets into a death spiral.
Moreover, if not for deregulation, airline costs would
probably have increased much more rapidly than they did
between 1978 and 1983. Deregulation both enabled and
compelled the formerly regulated carriers to seek ways to
cut costs. Regulation had done little to promote efficiency
or economy, since higher costs could simply be built into
every new fare level approved by the CAB. The reorgani-
zation of the carriers' route structures allowed the carriers
to achieve substantial "economies of scope." 8 By in-
creasing the numbers of related city-pairs through "hub-
bing," carriers were able to achieve "network" economies
in the form of more efficient airport facility usage, im-
proved scheduling and more optimal equipment utiliza-
tion. For example, by eliminating nonstop flights
between Nashville and Los Angeles, a carrier could use a
moderate-size 727 aircraft to carry passengers going to
Dallas and a dozen other cities to its DFW hub, where the
so Phillips, supra note 54, at 864-65 n.28. "Economies of scope exist if the cost
of producing given levels of outputs of two (or more) products in a single enter-
prise is less than that of producing the same products in separate enterprises." Id.
Such economies "have found a home in the corporate planning and strategy field
.. . under the vague concept of 'synergy.'" Id.
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Los-Angeles-bound passengers might join passengers
from twenty other mid-size cities aboard a larger and
more efficient DC-10 for the trip to Los Angeles. Airport
facilities in Nashville and Los Angeles could also be effi-
ciently utilized as bases for additional flights to DFW or
other stations of the carrier's choice. Further network
economies could then be realized. In addition, this net-
work can better satisfy passenger preference for single-
carrier service, which is widely preferred over inter-carrier
connections.
Deregulation also forced the airlines to reevaluate the
level of utilization of their aircraft and employees. Years
of public utility-type regulation produced inefficiencies re-
flected in the regulated carriers' cost structures. Most of
the new entrants, who built their organizations under de-
regulation, have achieved more efficient, less costly struc-
tures. For example, in 1981 Southwest's fully allocated
cost per passenger for a 200 mile market was $24 as com-
pared to $58 for United. 59 This cost difference was due in
large part to the higher productivity of Southwest's em-
ployees. Southwest's pilots and flight attendants flew
more hours than their counterparts with the regulated
carriers. Southwest's pilots flew 73 hours per month in
1981 while United's pilots averaged only 43 hours per
month. Southwest operated its aircraft 9.5 hours per day
in 1981; United operated its aircraft only 5.2 hours per
day. 60 Southwest keeps its planes in the air with its unpar-
alleled ten-minute turnaround at the gates. If its average
turnaround time were increased by just ten minutes,
Southwest would require five more aircraft, costing over
$16 million each, to operate the same number of flights.
Finally, Southwest's frequent flights enable it to more
fully utilize its airport facilities and employees.
These economies were forged in the heat of the compe-
tition which Southwest has experienced since its incep-
tion. Lack of price competition reduced the regulated
59 E. BAILEY, D. KAPLAN & D. GRAHAM, supra note 18, at 179.
- Id. at 180-181.
317
318 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
carriers' incentives to control costs and promote effi-
ciency. In a competitive environment, the successful firm
will be one which can reduce its costs and provide its
product at an attractive price to the consumer. Regula-
tion denied society the benefit of an efficient airline
industry.
Although the transition has been difficult for many air-
lines, the industry has finally been forced to consider the
efficient allocation of resources. In 1983, the airline in-
dustry realized its first profitable year since 1979, with an
aggregate operating profit over $500 million.6' The ef-
fects of the transformation of the industry will continue to
be uneven, however. American, which made a record
profit of $228 million in 1983, followed by a 1984 profit
of $234 million, has brilliantly positioned itself (with its
strategic DFW hub, strong balance sheet, revised labor
contracts, and planned deliveries of new aircraft) to be a
dominant member of the airline industry well into the
21st century. Undoubtedly, some others will fare less
well.
In a freely competitive market, the future can never be
predicted with certainty. The one certainty of the future is
that as long as the temptation to let the government do
"just a little" re-regulating can be resisted, a deregulated
airline industry will deliver its product efficiently and eco-
nomically. We can be assured of this, not by any govern-
ment edict, but only by the competitive forces of the
marketplace which dictate that the slothful, the unrespon-
sive, and the arrogant will not survive.
61 M. DERCHIN & R. TORTORA, supra note 38.
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